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Tinker at a Breaking Point: Why the Specter of
Cyberbullying Cannot Excuse Impermissible Public
School Regulation of Off-Campus Student Speech
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyberbullying is essentially speech that is disseminated via
electronic or digital means and is intended to embarrass, hurt, or
harass another person.1 The most common conduits of cyberbullying
include text messages, instant messages, email messages, social
networking sites such as Facebook or MySpace, and microblogging
sites such as Twitter. Cyberbullying is considered more pernicious
than traditional bullying because it allows “cruel or sadistic behavior
to be amplified and publicized, not just on the campus [of a school],
but throughout the world.”2 This amplification of the bullying
behavior may contribute to the “extreme emotional reaction”3
manifest when a victim of cyberbullying takes his or her own life.
Legislators, educators, parents, scholars, and students have
responded to the deaths of teenagers Ryan Hulligan,4 Megan Meier,5
1. See, e.g., Nat’l Crime Prevention Council, CYBERBULLYING FAQ FOR TEENS,
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/cyberbullying/cyberbullying-faq-for-teens (last visited Feb. 8,
2011); St. Peter’s School, TERMS YOU SHOULD KNOW, http://www.stpeterprince.org/
terms_you_should_know.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
2. Jeff Lieberman, Rutgers Student’s Suicide Prompts Privacy, Cyber-Bullying Debates
(PBS NewsHour broadcast Oct. 1, 2010), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/social_issues/july-dec10/rutgers1_10-01.html.
3. Id.
4. Thirteen-year-old Ryan took his own life in 2003 after suffering the humiliation of a
classmate fabricating an online relationship with him and then telling him it was all a joke in
front of a group of friends. After his death, Ryan’s parents discovered an alarming number of
instant messages and emails sent before Ryan’s suicide that were harassing and degrading to
their son. See Tiffani N. Garlic, Dad Uses Son’s Suicide to Show Dangers of Cyber-Bullying While
Speaking at Somerset County School, NJ.COM (Oct. 17, 2010, 6:02 AM), http://
www.nj.com/news/local/index.ssf/2010/10/dad_uses_sons_suicide_to_show.html; RYAN’S
STORY, http://www.ryanpatrickhalligan.org/index.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
5. Megan’s mother found Megan’s body in a closet after Megan hung herself before
her thirteenth birthday. Megan’s breaking point came when a sixteen-year old online “friend”
started sending steady, cruel messages to Megan via email and MySpace. Megan died before
anyone realized the boy was not real; a neighborhood parent had allegedly created the
fictitious profile and sent the offensive messages herself. Parents: Cyber Bullying Led to Teen’s
Suicide, ABC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=

501

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/3/2011 1:31 PM

2011

Phoebe Prince,6 Tyler Clementi,7 and others8 with a vigorous debate
over what role school entities can and should play in protecting
students by prohibiting this type of speech.9
A main focus of the debate is whether a public school entity that
regulates cyberbullying infringes on a student’s First Amendment
right to free speech. Under current and proposed statutory
schemes,10 speech that originates and often takes place entirely offcampus, without the use of school computers or other school
property and while the student is engaged in activities or events that
are in no way related to the school or to any school purpose, could
be regulated. Thus the question is whether the prevention of

3882520&page=1.
6. “[S]mart and charming” Phoebe, an Irish immigrant to Massachusetts, took her
own life at fifteen and just days before she was to attend her school’s winter cotillion. She had
endured bullying at school that soon spilled over into “taunting text messages and harassing
postings on Facebook.” Kathy McCabe, Teen’s Suicide Prompts a Look at Bullying,
BOSTON.COM (Jan. 24, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/education/k_12/articles/
2010/01/24/teens_suicide_prompts_a_look_at_bullying/; see also Yunji De Nies et al., Mean
Girls: Cyberbullying Blamed for Teen Suicides, ABC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Parenting/girls-teen-suicide-calls-attention-cyberbullying/
story?id=9685026.
7. Tyler, a freshman musician at Rutgers University, died when he jumped off the
George Washington Bridge in New York after his roommate and a classmate broadcast live
webcam footage of Tyler in a sexual encounter with another man over the Internet.
Lieberman, supra note 2.
8. Rachael Neblett suffered cyberbullying at the hand of an anonymous stalker and
took her life in 2006. Kelly Foreman, Cyber Crimes Division Created to Fight Internet Crimes,
KY.
LAW
ENFORCEMENT,
Winter
2008,
at
18,
available
at
http://
docjt.jus.state.ky.us/Magazines/Issue%2028/Cyber%20Crime_KLE%20Winter08.pdf.
Fifteen-year-old Jeffrey Johnston took his own life after suffering for years as a
victim of cyberbullying. Wayne K. Roustan, Boca Raton Conference Targets Cyberbullying
Threat, SUNSENTINEL.COM (Oct. 23, 2010), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-1023/news/fl-cyberbullying-boca-20101023_1_cyberbullying-phoebe-prince-safe-schoolsinstitute. Several other teen suicides have also been linked to cyberbullying.
9. See, e.g, Gil Kaufman, Students Speak out Against ‘Senseless’ Cyberbullying, MTV
NEWS (Oct 14, 2010, 6:52 AM), http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1649958/
20101013/story.jhtml; First Amendment Center, Cyber Bullying & Public Schools Online
Symposium,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/collection.aspx?item=cyberbullying_
public_schools; Laurie L. Levenson, Cyberbullying and a Student’s Suicide: What Isn’t Known
About Suicides, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Sept. 30, 2010, 9:43 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/09/30/cyberbullying-and-a-studentssuicide/what-isnt-known-about-suicides.
10. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356 (2009);
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303.1-A (2008); H.R. 2569, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, §§ 37H37O (2010); 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2010) 1303.1-A (a)(1)(i).

502

DO NOT DELETE

501

5/3/2011 1:31 PM

Tinker at a Breaking Point

cyberbullying is so compelling an interest as to justify the ability of
public school entities to regulate such a broad scope of student
speech.
This debate sets states’ clear interests in protecting children and
maintaining a safe and educationally conducive environment at
school and at school-sponsored activities against the individual
student’s constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
Though there is a compelling need to protect children from the
insidious harm inflicted through cyberbullying, many statutes and
local school policies permitting broad limitations on individual
speech are not the least restrictive means through which such an
interest is met. Unfortunately, considering the strong policy
arguments on both sides of this issue obfuscates rather than clarifies
where the appropriate balance lies. Children are often the weakest
and most easily victimized members of society. Consequently, they
not only deserve but often desperately need protection. Additionally,
the effects of cyberbullying can be pernicious and particularly
destructive to children and youth in their early adolescence.11
However, First Amendment scholarship and jurisprudence make it
clear that freedom of speech is a most decidedly cherished and
vigorously protected constitutional right.
This Comment does not propose that cyberbullying should be
tolerated without any consequences whatsoever. It recognizes that
much of what is categorized as cyberbullying is a distasteful and
potentially damaging form of speech. However, in order to
appropriately defend the individual’s right to free speech, the
regulation by public-school entities of off-campus student speech
must be narrowly tailored to prevent a limited class of speech that is
either already under the school’s authority to regulate or that rises to
the level of a “true threat.”12 Thus, schools would maintain the
power to regulate speech through which the speaker means “to
11. Cyberbullying has been shown to be correlated with lower self-esteem and increased
tendencies towards suicide. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Research
Summary: Cyberbullying and Self-Esteem, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR. (2010),
http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_and_self_esteem_research_fact_sheet.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 8, 2011); Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Research Summary:
Cyberbullying
and
Suicide,
CYBERBULLYING
RESEARCH
CTR.
(2010),
http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_and_suicide_research_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited
Feb. 8, 2011).
12. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
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communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.”13 The alternative—allowing a broad infringement of
students’ First Amendment rights by public-school entities in
misguided and sometimes inefficient efforts to control
cyberbullying—sweeps in too much speech that should be protected.
Such actions cannot be upheld as permissible under the
Constitution.
Therefore, school administrators must exercise care in how far
they are willing to go to regulate student speech. Regulation of
student speech that (1) originates and concludes wholly outside the
physical boundaries of the school campus, (2) is neither created nor
propagated at an event that is not reasonably discernible as a school
function, (3) is facilitated with devices and services that are not
school owned, and (4) does not “materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school”14 is most certainly a violation of the First
Amendment. Such an infringement of a constitutionally guaranteed
right would surely subject school administrators to liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. However, the law governing school entities’
regulation of student speech that falls short in one of these four
elements is an inconsistent legal labyrinth of state and federal
decisions.
Recent judicial events place the concerns in this nascent area of
law in stark relief and present the opportunity to carefully evaluate
where the law currently stands and where it should go from here.
Courts have not extensively adjudicated disputes centered on the
question of whether and to what extent school entities may regulate
student-on-student off-campus speech that meets the definition of
cyberbullying. However, in cases where school entities have
regulated
student-on-teacher
or
student-on-administrator
cyberbullying,15 there is not only a split amongst various courts, but
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently
13. Id.
14. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966), cited in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
15. Student-on-teacher or student-on-administrator cyberbullying includes instances of
student speech where students have emailed, posted, or texted lewd, harassing, violent, or
threatening material directed at a teacher or administrator.

504

DO NOT DELETE

501

5/3/2011 1:31 PM

Tinker at a Breaking Point

itself split when it published two opposite holdings on cases with
almost identical fact patterns.16
This Comment includes an analysis of the incongruous and
inconclusive case law on point, an examination of the two cases that
literally split the Third Circuit, and a recommendation that courts
employ the “true threat” doctrine in the cyberbullying debate. Thus,
schools may permissibly regulate true threats to students while
preserving acceptable protection for individual students’ First
Amendment rights.
II. JURISPRUDENCE: REGULATION OF STUDENT SPEECH BY PUBLIC
SCHOOL ENTITIES
The case law related to regulation of off-campus student speech
is extremely inconsistent. An attempt to contextualize the current
jurisprudential landscape requires first, a review of the precedent
under which a public school may constitutionally regulate student
speech generally and second, a case-by-case analysis of the discordant
decisions arising in state and federal courts when public school
entities attempted to regulate off-campus student speech specifically.
A. Foundational Principles
Three cases decided by the United States Supreme Court set the
basic guidelines within which public schools can permissibly regulate
student speech: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,17 Bethel School District v. Fraser,18 and Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier.19 Generally, Tinker provides strong protection
for student speech unless such speech causes a material and
substantial interference with the appropriate discipline and operation
of the school or infringes on the rights of another.20 Fraser serves as
an exception to Tinker’s general rule when the school can show that

16. See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g
granted No. 08-438, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010); Layshock ex rel.
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g granted No.
07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
17. 393 U.S. 503.
18. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
19. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
20. 393 U.S. at 512–13.
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the student’s speech was offensive, lewd, or indecent.21 And
Hazelwood avers that a school may regulate student speech that bears
the imprimatur of the school so long as such regulation is shown to
be reasonably related to the school’s pedagogical concerns.22 As the
factual circumstances of these cases have bearing on the discussion at
hand, a brief summary of each follows.
1. Tinker’s material and substantial interference
In Tinker, several junior high and high school students planned
to wear black armbands to school as part of a protest against the
Vietnam War.23 Administrators at the students’ respective schools
discovered the planned protest and adopted a policy prohibiting the
wearing of armbands at school.24 The students knew of the policy,
but wore the armbands to school anyway.25 They were subsequently
sent home and suspended from school unless they returned without
the armbands.26 The Tinker Court held that this was an improper
violation of the students’ First Amendment rights.27 The Court
reasoned that unless the students’ expressive conduct “‘materially
and substantially interfer[ed] with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school’ [or] . . . collid[ed] with the
rights of others,” it could not be regulated without offending the
First Amendment.28
Additionally, the Tinker opinion included other guidance often
cited by lower courts examining this issue and thus applicable to the
contemporary debate. First, the Court stated that for fifty years it
had held that neither “students [n]or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech . . . at the schoolhouse
gate.”29 Additionally, the Court emphasized that in this case there

21. 478 U.S. at 685.
22. 484 U.S. at 272–73.
23. 393 U.S. at 504.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 513–14.
28. Id. at 512–13 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
29. Id. at 506 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262
U.S. 404 (1923)).
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were not any “threats or acts of violence on school premises.”30
Further, the Court clarified that “a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint” is not sufficient reason for a public-school entity to
infringe on an individual’s free-speech rights.31 Importantly, the
Court noted that “[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority
over their students” and that students, whether in or out of school,
are “‘persons’ under our Constitution” and are “possessed of
fundamental rights.”32 Finally, there is a small piece of the opinion
that subsequent courts have used to support the broad application of
Tinker to speech that is found to have occurred off-campus:
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.33

2. Fraser’s offensive, lewd, and indecent speech
Conversely, in Fraser,34 the Court upheld a school
administrator’s decision to suspend a student who used “an
elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor” in a speech
delivered at a school assembly.35 Though there was not necessarily a
material and substantial interference with school operations, the
Fraser court held that the school acted “within its permissible
authority in imposing sanctions . . . in response to [the student’s]
offensively lewd and indecent speech.”36 In a later case, the Court
outlined the two main principles arising from Fraser:37 first, that “the
constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings,”38 and second, that the material and substantial-interference
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Id. at 677–78.
Id. at 685.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394 (2007).
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682, quoted in Morse, 551 U.S. at 396–97.
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analysis under Tinker is “not absolute.”39 Fraser stands as an example
of a fact-driven case in which the Court was willing to make an
exception to the Tinker standard. Providing an exception to a
generally speech-protective rule is not an uncommon stance for the
Court where lewd, graphic, and sexual speech is at issue.40 It seems
even less of a surprise where such speech was asserted in a setting
where minor students were essentially a captive audience.41
3. Hazelwood’s imprimatur and reasonable pedagogical concerns
Additionally, in Hazelwood,42 the Court upheld a school’s
regulation of student speech when it held that the principal’s
removal of two pages from an edition of the school paper was not an
infringement of the students’ First Amendment rights.43 The excised
pages included two articles that detailed student experiences with
divorce and teen pregnancy but also contained other articles that
were not offensive.44 The principal, upon reading the articles in
question, believed first, that the topics were inappropriate for some
of the students at the school, and second, that there was a risk some
of the students involved in the pregnancy article could be identified
from the context of the articles, and that such identification—even if
unintended—would be a violation of the students’ privacy rights.45
The Court held that the principal was justified in “exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech” in the

39. Morse, 551 U.S. at 394.
40. As early as Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Court
demonstrated a willingness to regulate speech that is lewd, obscene, and utterly without
redeeming social import or value, particularly where the state interest in preserving morality is
more compelling than allowing freedom of this type of speech. See also Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Redrup v. New York,
386 U.S. 767 (1967) (setting the stage for a period of time in which the U.S. Supreme Court
would review and summarily reverse whenever five justices voted using their own individual
tests); A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. of
Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (holding that obscenity was speech that was “utterly without
redeeming social value”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
41. Courts have indicated a willingness to allow more regulation of lewd and offensive
speech when the audience consists of minors who are expected or required to attend the event
at which the speech is offered. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684–85; Morse, 551 U.S. 393.
42. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
43. Id. at 272–73.
44. Id. at 263, 264 n.1.
45. Id. at 263.
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paper because the newspaper was not a public forum and because
school entities have authority to regulate speech that occurs “in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”46
Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood form the jurisprudential
foundations for, and the basic limitations on, how and when publicschool entities may constitutionally regulate students’ speech.47
Despite the seemingly strong protection afforded student speech
under Tinker and the relatively limited exceptions in Fraser and
Hazelwood, a rash of cases examining student-on-teacher and/or
student-on-administrator cyberbullying have resulted in holdings
that are surprisingly inconsistent when compared with these three
foundational cases and are irreconcilable when compared with each
other. The resulting jurisprudential morass includes narrow
constructions of these foundational cases as well as expansive
applications where almost any student speech could be permissibly
regulated by a public school entity. Indeed, courts have willingly
extended Tinker48 not to protect speech but to allow regulation of
speech that happens not only outside the classroom but wholly
beyond the physical borders of the school campus and often within
the confines of students’ homes.49 Such expansive application
enlarges the Tinker standard beyond a reasonable interpretation and
places courts on the verge of granting schools unprecedented
authority to regulate speech that, though unpleasant, falls squarely
within the protection of the First Amendment.

46. Id. at 270, 273.
47. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), could be included here as well because it
upheld a principal’s regulation of off-campus student speech offered at a school-sanctioned
event that was contrary to the anti-drug policy of the school. This case is discussed later in this
Comment, see infra Part II.B.1, because in this analysis, Morse’s holding regarding whether the
speech was offered on- or off-campus seems more pertinent than the holding that speech
advocating the use of illegal drugs may be regulated outside of the Tinker analysis.
48. Several such cases are discussed throughout this Comment.
49. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
(indicating that “conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which . . . materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is . . . not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech” but not explicitly
authorizing regulation of speech that is wholly off-campus (emphasis added)).
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B. Reaching Beyond School Boundaries: On-campus vs. Off-campus
Speech
Schools may permissibly regulate speech that meets Tinker’s
material and substantial interference standard or Fraser’s lewd,
offensive, and indecent standard when such speech occurs oncampus, meaning within the physical boundaries of the school
grounds, or at official school events such as assemblies, field trips,
athletic contests, and so on. The Tinker standard evolved under facts
occurring on a school campus.50 Fraser’s lewd speech was given at an
official school event.51 Additionally, under Hazelwood, schools may
permissibly regulate expressive speech that reasonably bears the
imprimatur of the school, such as newspapers, drama productions,
concerts, recitals, and the like.52 However, regulation of speech
occurring via the Internet is an entirely new playing field—one in
which students can express themselves from almost any location in
the world and can do so anonymously if they so choose.
Cyberbullying can originate at home, in a park, from an office, or on
school property. Therefore, the first question that state and federal
courts have to resolve in examining this issue is “For purposes of
regulation, is the student speech happening ‘on-campus’ or ‘offcampus’?”53 Generally, if the speech occurs off-campus, the school’s
authority to regulate it is significantly diminished unless the speech is
otherwise unprotected.54
1. Explicitly on-campus speech: on school property or at school-sanctioned
events
The clearest answer to the question of whether speech occurs onor off-campus is that speech transpires on-campus if the student
speaks, offers, or creates it on school property. In Klein v. Smith, a
50. Id. at 504.
51. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986).
52. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988).
53. Indeed, courts have acknowledged this distinction as the “threshold issue” when
determining whether the school-entity regulation was constitutional or not. See J.S. ex rel. H.S.
v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002).
54. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1372–73 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (citing Fenton v.
Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that a school entity could regulate
“fighting words” even when they were offered off-campus and outside of any schoolsanctioned activity because they are unprotected speech)).

510

DO NOT DELETE

501

5/3/2011 1:31 PM

Tinker at a Breaking Point

student saw a teacher in a restaurant parking lot and made an
offensive gesture by extending his middle finger.55 Pursuant to a
school policy prohibiting “vulgar or extremely inappropriate
language or conduct directed to a staff member,” the school
suspended the student for ten days.56 The U.S. district court in
Maine held that the connection between an offensive physical
gesture made by a student to a teacher and the “proper and orderly
operation of the school’s activities [was] . . . far too attenuated” to
justify impinging on the student’s First Amendment rights.57 The
gesture was made off of school premises, away from any school
facilities, when neither the student nor the teacher were “engaged in
any school activity or associated in any way with school premises.”58
Courts have similarly held that written student speech—such as an
underground newspaper—that is created, offered, and propagated
away from the school property cannot be regulated by the school
without offense to the First Amendment.59
However, schools may constitutionally regulate student speech
that technically happens off school property but is related to a
school-sanctioned activity or event. In Morse v. Frederick, the U.S.
Supreme Court held there was sufficient evidence to implicate the
unique concerns of the school entity when a student held up a
banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” while observing the
Olympic torch relay from a position across the street from the
school.60 Though the student was away from school property, the
Court reasoned that (1) the event was during school hours, (2) it
was approved by the administration as a class trip, (3) the school
rules provided that students were subject to student conduct rules
while at the approved trip, (4) the student was surrounded by other

55. 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1440–41 (D. Me. 1986).
56. Id. at 1441.
57. Id. at 1441–42 (quoting the school policy).
58. Id. at 1441.
59. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d
Cir. 1979) (holding that a school had impermissibly punished the speech of students who
created and sold an offensive publication off campus that was not related to the school or to
any school activity); Shanly v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., Bexar Cnty., Tex., 462 F.2d 960, 970–
71, 978 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding the school’s discipline of students an impermissible
infringement of the First Amendment where the speech in question was a newspaper that was
not disruptive and was distributed away from the school property).
60. 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007).
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students and teachers, and (5) the group was located just across the
street from the school.61 Morse indicates that in addition to
regulating on-campus speech, there is room to regulate off-campus
speech that meets some or all of the above factors, the most relevant
perhaps being that the event is school sanctioned, and that school
rules of behavior apply.62
Though neither of these cases deals specifically with offensive
Internet speech that could be classified as cyberbullying, they set a
workable boundary for where a school’s authority ends and a
student’s autonomy begins. Significantly, although many cases
involving cyberbullying seem to indicate a preference for a
broadening of this boundary, some have situated themselves
comfortably and squarely within the “on school property” or “at a
school-sanctioned event” boundaries.
In one case examining an instance of speech that, at least facially,
meets the definition of student-on-student cyberbullying, a U.S.
district court in Washington held that a website created by a student
away from school, and without the use of any school computers or
resources, had a distinctly “out-of-school nature.”63 In Emmett v.
Kent School District, the student was suspended for five days after he
created a website on which he posted fake obituaries of his friends
and invited visitors to vote on who would die next.64 The court
reasoned that unlike the speech in Fraser, the website was not
offered in a school assembly, and unlike Hazelwood, it was not
offered as part of an official school publication, class, or project.65
The court went on to say that the student speech was “entirely
outside of the school’s supervision or control” even if the content
seemed clearly connected to the school.66
In contrast, when examining other instances of cyberbullying,
some courts have been willing to extend the schoolmaster’s reach
and allow school entities to regulate student speech occurring off-

61. Id. at 400–01.
62. Id. at 399–401.
63. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wa.
2000).
64. Id. at 1089. The student was initially expelled, but the expulsion was later modified
to a five-day suspension. Id.
65. Id. at 1090.
66. Id.
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campus pursuant to two basic analyses. One is more moderate and
allows school entities to regulate off-campus student speech when
there is a “sufficient nexus” between the student speech and the
operations of the school.67 The second allows school entities to
regulate off-campus student speech when the school can show
merely a foreseeable risk of a material and substantial interference of
school operations.68 Both approaches allow impermissibly broad
regulation of student speech by schools.
2. Implicitly on-campus speech: the sufficient nexus
As noted previously, language in the Tinker decision indicated
the possibility that schools could permissibly regulate out-ofclassroom speech.69 Fraser buoyed the assertion that schools may
have authority to regulate behavior beyond classroom walls by
rearticulating the policy that public education had the responsibility
to “prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic,” that part of that
preparation included “inculcat[ing] [students with] the habits and
manners of civility,”70 and that generally, “the constitutional rights
of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings.”71 Courts have applied these
statements liberally in granting school entities the authority to
regulate not just speech outside of a classroom but speech that
occurs completely away from campus and often in the privacy of a
student’s home. If such speech is aimed at the school or someone at
the school and then reaches the school or is accessed at school in

67. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa.
2002).
68. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007); Doninger v.
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
69. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. To reiterate, the case states:
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (emphasis added).
70. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting CHARLES
AUSTIN BEARD & MARY RITTER BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228
(1968) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
71. Id. at 682 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–42 (1985)).
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some form, there may be a sufficient nexus to regulate the speech
under Tinker.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School
District articulated the impermissibly expansive and frustratingly
ambiguous “sufficient nexus” standard.72 The case arose when an
eighth-grade student used a computer at his home to create a
website that was then available via the Internet.73 The website
contained “derogatory, profane, offensive, and threatening
comments” directed at one of the student’s teachers and the
principal of his school.74 The website and its attendant pages were
subsequently viewed by students, faculty members, and
administrators at the student’s school.75 In answering the question of
whether this was speech that occurred on- or off-campus, the court
quoted Hazelwood, saying, “[a] school need not tolerate student
speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission’ even
though the government could not censor similar speech outside the
school.”76 The court went on to explain that as long as there is a
“sufficient nexus between the [digital or electronic communication]
and the school campus to consider the speech as occurring oncampus,” then the analysis under Tinker, Fraser, and/or Hazelwood
could move forward.77 Thus, if a sufficient nexus can be shown, the
speech becomes, essentially, on-campus speech and can be regulated
under the same standards as speech that is explicitly made on school
property or as part of a school-sanctioned event or activity.
Importantly, the Bethlehem court provided two general factors
that come into play when determining whether there is a sufficient
nexus to justify the school entity’s regulation of the student speech.
To establish a sufficient nexus, the student speech must be “speech
that is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel [and] is
brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its
originator.”78 Though broader than the requirement that the speech

72. Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 865.
73. Id. at 850.
74. Id. at 851.
75. Id. at 851–52.
76. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266
(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at 865 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 865. But see Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 801 (N.D. Ohio
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happen on school property or in conjunction with a schoolsanctioned event or activity, the sufficient nexus standard at least
maintains the threshold question of determining whether the speech
occurred on- or off-campus. Other courts have found this threshold
question unnecessary if the school can show that there is at least a
foreseeable risk that the speech would lead to a material and
substantial interference with school discipline and operations.
3. Foreseeable risk of a material and substantial interference
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has demonstrated a
proclivity to stretch Tinker beyond the sufficient nexus standard of
Bethlehem and to encourage a rule that would allow public school
entities to regulate any student speech that would create a
foreseeable risk of a material and substantial interference to the
operation of the school. This extremely broad standard is exemplified
first in Wisniewski v. Board of Education,79 and second in Doninger v.
Niehoff.80
In Wisniewski, an eighth-grader created an icon for use in his
instant messaging program.81 The icon was “a pistol firing a bullet at
a person’s head above which were dots representing splattered
blood.”82 Text that accompanied the icon said, “Kill Mr.
VanderMolen,” who was the student’s teacher.83 The eighth-grader
sent the icon to some of his friends but it was never sent to the
school or to the teacher.84 The court did not even ask the “threshold
question”85 of whether the speech was on- or off-campus, but
instead immediately applied the Tinker standard and held that the
student’s off-campus speech could have “create[d] a foreseeable risk
of substantial disruption within a school.”86 The court specified that
under Tinker the decision of whether speech will “materially and

2002) (holding that a school’s discipline of a student based on the content of a website viewed
at school was impermissible pursuant to the First Amendment).
79. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
80. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
81. 494 F.3d at 35–36.
82. Id. at 36.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002).
86. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39.

515

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/3/2011 1:31 PM

2011

substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school” is left to
school officials’ reasonable conclusions.87
The court’s foreseeable risk test was also applied in Doninger
when the court held that the school permissibly punished a student
for posting a pejorative blog regarding an administrative decision
with which the student disagreed.88 The court stated in dicta that if
the student had delivered what she wrote on the Internet via
handbills at school, her speech would have been subject to the Fraser
rule, but then admitted that “[i]t is not clear . . . that Fraser applies
to off-campus speech.”89 Ultimately, the court found that under the
previous holding in Wisniewski the Tinker standard applied and held
that the student’s Internet post “foreseeably create[d] a risk of
substantial disruption within the school environment.”90
Thus, various courts have engaged in incongruent analyses
ranging from a moderate application of the foundational cases to a
liberal use of alternative theories under which schools can more
aggressively regulate student off-campus speech. Some, like Emmett,
hold to the proposition that there is a threshold question to be
answered—did the speech occur on- or off-campus? If it is oncampus speech or speech that occurs as part of a school sanctioned
event, the school entity will be allowed broad, discretionary
regulation of the student speech. If it is off-campus speech, some
courts will limit the school’s regulatory authority. Others, such as
Bethlehem, hold that student speech does not have to actually occur
on-campus to be deemed “on-campus speech.” Student speech can
be implicitly on-campus if the school can show a sufficient nexus
between the speech in question and the operation of the school.
Finally, as demonstrated in Wisniewski and Doninger, the Second
Circuit has adopted the most expansive rule which allows the public
school entity to regulate student speech if the school entity itself can
determine that there is a foreseeable risk that the speech will lead to a
material and substantial interference with school operations.

87.
(1969)).
88.
89.
90.
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Id. at 50 (quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40).
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III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT SPLIT: LAYSHOCK AND BLUE MOUNTAIN
The debate over whether the threshold question of on-campus
versus off-campus speech should persevere91—whether a school need
show nothing more than a foreseeable risk of a material and
substantial disruption,92 or whether an entirely new standard should
apply93—is coming to a head as demonstrated by two cases that
resulted in a Third Circuit split: Layshock ex rel. Layshock v.
Hermitage School District94 and J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain
School District.95 Based on nearly identical facts, the cases were heard
by separate three-judge panels that produced opposite holdings in
opinions filed on exactly the same day. In response to petitions filed
by parties in both cases, both opinions were vacated and were
reheard en banc in June 2010.96 As of writing this Comment, the
court has not published a new opinion for either case.

91. See, e.g., Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students’ Rights: The Need for an
Enhanced First Amendment Standard to Protect Off-campus Student Internet Speech, 36 CAP.
U. L. REV. 129 (2007) (maintaining that the threshold question should be preserved to
prevent schools from applying Tinker to off-campus speech); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student
Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027 (2008) (contending that minors are
entitled to strong free speech rights and that the application of Tinker, regardless of whether
the speech was on- or off-campus provides insufficient protection to such rights).
92. See, e.g., Karly Zande, When the School Bully Attacks in the Living Room: Using
Tinker to Regulate Off-campus Student Cyberbullying, 13 BARRY L. REV. 103, 134 (2009)
(averring that schools should be permitted to make a “reasonabl[e] forecast” of a material and
substantial disruption in order to apply Tinker and regulate the student speech, even when it
occurs off-campus); Duffy B. Trager, Note, New Tricks for Old Dogs: The Tinker Standard
Applied to Cyber-Bullying, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 553 (2009) (asserting that the Tinker standard
includes and is appropriate for the regulation of cyberbully-esque speech).
93. See, e.g., Markey, supra note 91, at 132 (discussing a standard requiring that a
“student knowingly or recklessly distributes the speech on-campus”); Harriet A. Hoder, Note,
Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public School Jurisdiction Over Students’ Online
Activity, 50 B. C. L. REV. 1563, 1594 (2009) (arguing for a “control and supervision” test
giving the school authority to regulate speech only when the school has assumed “control and
supervision” over the student at the time the student offers her speech).
94. 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g granted No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
95. 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g granted No. 08-438, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
96. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 08438, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
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Layshock and Blue Mountain were not the first cases the Third
Circuit heard on this issue. Nine years before the Third Circuit split
itself, it decided Saxe v. State College Area School District,97 a case
that would be cited by several other courts examining the issue of
school regulation of student speech.98 In Saxe, the Third Circuit
showed a reluctance to employ a foreseeable risk standard. The case
arose when a student preemptively challenged a school policy on
harassment claiming that it violated the First Amendment.99 The
court’s main holding was that the harassment policy was
unconstitutionally overbroad, and would sweep in a large amount of
student speech that should be protected.100 Because there was
neither an actual restriction nor any student speech at issue in this
case, the question of where the speech would occur was largely
ignored.101 However, in its discussion of Tinker, the court reiterated
that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression”102 but that
a restriction on speech may pass constitutional muster if the “school
can point to a well-founded expectation of disruption—especially one
based on past incidents arising out of similar speech.”103 Thus, the
court indicated that when Tinker is applied, the proof of the material
and substantial interference must be specific and concrete.104 This
precedential interpretation of the Tinker standard appears to hold
schools to a higher standard than the foreseeable risk language
promulgated by the Second Circuit, but was subsequently
overlooked to varying extents in both cases that follow.105
97. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
98. See, e.g., Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d at 296–97, 305–06, 312, 314; Layshock, 593
F.3d at 257, 261; Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 325, 327–29 (2d Cir. 2006); Bowler v.
Town of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168, 176 (D. Mass. 2007); Governor Wentworth Reg’l
Sch. Dist. v. Hendrickson, 421 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421 (D. N.H. 2006); Grzywna v.
Schenectady Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F. Supp. 2d 139, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 2006); Killion v. Franklin
Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 453, 455, 459 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
99. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 203–04.
100. Id. at 214.
101. But see id. at 216 n.11 (“Saxe even suggests that the Policy could even be read to
cover conduct occurring outside of school premises. This reading is not implausible based on
the Policy’s plain language, and would raise additional constitutional questions.”).
102. Id. at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. Though both Laycock and Blue Moutain cite Saxe, neither relies substantially on the

518

DO NOT DELETE

501

5/3/2011 1:31 PM

Tinker at a Breaking Point
A. Layshock: Limiting the Schoolmaster’s Reach Under Fraser

In Layshock, the school district relied heavily on the sufficient
nexus and foreseeable risk standards from Bethlehem and the Second
Circuit cases discussed supra. The Layshock court summarily rejected
the school district’s arguments and held that where a high school
senior had created a “parody profile” of his principal on a popular
social networking site using his grandmother’s computer while at his
grandmother’s house,106 the school district’s punishment of offcampus student speech was impermissibly violative of the student’s
First Amendment free speech rights.107 The student did not use any
school resources to create the profile, but he did copy a photo of the
principal from the school district’s website.108 The profile contained
language that was profane and lewd and that was clearly disparaging
towards the principal.109 It was not long before most of the student
body had at least heard of, if not seen, the profile.110 In this case, the
students were able to view and did view the profile on school
computers during school hours.111 The student claimed that the
profile was made as a joke,112 but was later suspended from school
for ten days, placed in the Alternative Education Program at the
school for the remainder of the school year, prohibited from
participating in any extracurricular activities, and barred from
participating in his graduation ceremony at the conclusion of the
year.113
The district court analyzed the case first under the sufficient
nexus standard and held that the school district was unable to
“establish[] a sufficient nexus between [the student’s] speech and a

specific application of Tinker. Thus, though Saxe as a whole is not overlooked, certainly the
analysis concerning the proper application of the Tinker standard is.
106. Layshock ex. rel Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir.
2010), vacated, reh’g granted 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. 2010).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. 252–53.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 253.
112. Id. at 253 n.4.
113. Id. at 254. Other students who created subsequent fictional profiles of the principal
that were more vulgar and offensive than the original parody profile were not punished at all.
Id.
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substantial disruption of the school environment.”114 On appeal, the
Third Circuit held that the punishment in this case was an improper
regulation that infringed on the student’s First Amendment rights,
that there was no nexus between the student speech and a material
and substantial interference with school operation, and that the
school district could not punish the student based only on the fact
that his speech came within the physical boundaries of the school.115
The Layshock court first examined the school district’s argument
that the student had “entered” school property by accessing the
school district website to copy the principal’s picture.116 The court
compared the facts in this case with Thomas v. Board of Education
where the court held that school regulation of the speech in question
was impermissible even when students stored an offensive studentwritten and student-edited periodical in a school classroom and
completed some work on the publication at school while using
school resources.117 In Layshock, the court held that the connection
between the student’s conduct and the school was even more fragile
than the connection in Thomas and refused to “allow the School
District to stretch its authority so far that it reaches [a student]
sitting in his grandmother’s home after school.”118 The court added
that “[i]t would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow
the state in the guise of school authorities to reach into a child’s
home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that they
can control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored
activities.”119
The Layshock court then turned to the school district’s second
argument—that the speech was permissibly regulated because it was
lewd and vulgar and “was aimed at the School District community
and the Principal and was accessed on campus by [the student] [and]
[i]t was reasonably foreseeable that the profile would come to the
attention of the School District and the Principal.”120 The court

114. Id. at 258 (quoting Layschock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F.
Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007)).
115. Id. at 263.
116. Id. at 259.
117. Id. (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979)).
118. Id. at 260.
119. Id.
120. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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analyzed this question pursuant to Fraser rather than Tinker because
the school district failed to show that the student’s out of school
speech created a material and substantial interference of school
operations.121 Importantly, the court distinguished key cases122 upon
which the school district’s argument relied, and through which
various courts had sanctioned the regulation of off-campus student
speech that was lewd, vulgar, and/or offensive under Tinker’s
material and substantial interference analysis, rather than under the
narrow exception for such speech created in Fraser.123 The Layshock
court reiterated that the “willingness to defer to the schoolmaster’s
expertise in administering school discipline rests, in large measure,
upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach
beyond the schoolhouse gate.”124 The court stopped short of making
a precise determination of the perimeter of the schoolmaster’s reach,
but held that in this case the student speech did not disrupt the
school as required by Tinker and that, pursuant to Fraser, even if the
off-campus speech is lewd, vulgar, or offensive, it is still protected
under the First Amendment.125
B. Blue Mountain: Expanding the Schoolmaster’s Reach Under Tinker
The facts in Blue Mountain closely parallel those in Layshock, but
the analysis and subsequent holdings are significantly divergent. In
Blue Mountain, a middle school student and her friend working at
their respective homes, using personal computers, and using an
instant messaging program to facilitate their collaboration, created a
sham profile on a social networking site.126 Unlike the profile in
Layshock, this profile did not mention the real name of any person,
but like the Layshock profile, it did use a photograph of the school

121. Id. at 261.
122. Including Bethlehem (sufficient nexus), Wisniewski (foreseeable risk), and Doninger
(foreseeable risk).
123. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 261.
124. Id. at 263 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044–45 (2d Cir.
1979)).
125. Id.
126. 593 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) (rehearing en banc granted, opinion vacated Apr.
09, 2010).
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principal that the students had copied from the school district’s
website.127
Like the profile in Layshock, this profile included insulting and
vulgar content, and like the student in Layshock, the student here
asserted that she created the site as a joke with her friends.128 In this
case, though, the profile could not be viewed on-campus using
school-owned computers because the school’s network blocked the
particular social networking site.129 Still, word of the profile spread
and students accessed it from other locations.130 The students in this
case were also suspended from school for ten days, but unlike the
more severe penalties imposed on the student in Layshock, these
students were not punished beyond the temporary suspension from
school.131 Ultimately, one of the students brought suit claiming that
the school had violated her First Amendment right to free speech.132
The district court granted summary judgment to the school district,
holding that even though the student created the profile at her
home, and even though the profile did not materially and
substantially disrupt school, the school district’s punishment of her
speech did not violate the student’s First Amendment rights because
her “lewd and vulgar off-campus speech had an effect on campus.”133
In her appeal, the student argued that her speech, even if it were
lewd and vulgar, was protected by the First Amendment “because it
occurred entirely outside the Middle School” and generally, the First
Amendment protects even lewd and vulgar speech outside of a
school setting.134 Unlike the Layshock court, the Blue Mountain court
declined to engage in an analysis under Fraser and instead went
immediately to Tinker, stating that the speech may be regulated “if it
would substantially disrupt school operations or interfere with the
right of others.”135 Moreover, the court explicitly stated that an
127. Id.
128. Id. at 292.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 295 (quoting J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. No. 3:07cv585,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72685, *7–8 (M.D. Pa. 2008)).
134. Id. at 299 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 25–26 (1971)).
135. Id. at 298 (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir.
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inquiry regarding where the speech occurred—on- or off-campus—
was unnecessary.136
In its analysis, the Blue Mountain court relied on Doninger and
other cases in finding that a school entity does not have to wait for
an actual disruption of school operations to occur. Contrary to the
requirement of specific and concrete proof of the material and
substantial interference articulated in Saxe,137 this court reasoned that
it could “[look] to all of the circumstances confronting the school
officials that might reasonably portend disruption.”138 Ultimately,
the Blue Mountain court held that the “profile presented a
reasonable possibility of a future disruption” of operations139 and that
“off-campus speech that causes or reasonably threatens to cause a
substantial disruption of or material interference with a school need
not satisfy any geographical technicality in order to be regulated
pursuant to Tinker.”140 In stark contrast with the considerably more
restrained approach by the Layshock court, Blue Mountain’s
“reasonable possibility of a reasonable threat of a substantial
disruption or material interference” is imprecise, unwieldy, and even
more inclusive than the foreseeable risk standard. Moreover, it
sweeps in mounds of student speech that should clearly be protected
under the First Amendment.
Thus, even within the same circuit court, it is unclear whether
public school entities may permissibly regulate off-campus student
speech under Tinker, or if off-campus student speech that is vulgar
or lewd can be analyzed only under Fraser. Additionally, under the

2001)). Note the contradictory reasoning and outcomes in these cases. The Layshock court
accepted the district court’s holding that the speech in that case did not meet the material and
substantial requirement of Tinker and thus fell under a Fraser analysis and held the regulation
of speech impermissible. The Blue Mountain court also accepted the district court’s holding
that the speech in this case was lewd and vulgar under Fraser, but found the Fraser analysis
unnecessary because the “profile at issue, though created off-campus, falls within the realm of
student speech subject to regulation under Tinker” and because the speech had an effect oncampus, the regulation was constitutionally permissible. Id.
136. Id. (citing Saxe 240 F.3d at 212 (holding that when a public school entity “can
point to a well-founded expectation of disruption—especially one based on previous incidents
arising out of similar speech—a restriction may pass constitutional muster”)).
137. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 299.
138. Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d at 298 (quoting LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d
981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
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Tinker analysis, it is unclear whether school entities must establish a
“sufficient nexus” between the speech in question and the school
disturbance. It is also unclear whether the school entity must provide
specific and concrete evidence of similar speech that previously
resulted in a material and substantial interference with school
operations, if the school entity must demonstrate a well-founded
belief that the disruption will occur, or if the school must assert that
there is merely a foreseeable risk that the speech would result in a
material and substantial disruption of the school operations. It is in
this quagmire of erratic case law and ambiguous precedent that these
cases have been reheard and must now be re-decided.
IV. INTENT MATTERS: HOW “TRUE THREATS” CAN BRING TINKER
BACK FROM THE BRINK
The foreseeable risk standard asserted in Wisniewski and
Doninger and relied on in the vacated opinion in Blue Mountain
turns Tinker on its head and will allow ever-increasing regulation of
student speech. Indeed, there is a foreseeable risk that the previously
narrow Fraser and Hazelwood exceptions to the protective Tinker
standard will now be swallowed up and analyzed under the new,
broader application of Tinker—an application that is designed not to
protect speech but to more freely regulate it. This seems particularly
to be the case if Blue Mountain’s “reasonable possibility” standard
survives. Such a standard leaves the school free to regulate an almost
indeterminate amount of student off-campus speech.
This may not initially offend our sense of First Amendment
protections because the speech that schools want to regulate is often
profane, rude, violent, or all of the above. Additionally, the publicity
surrounding the tragic deaths of teenagers who are victims of similar
speech may encourage us to embrace more rather than less
regulation of student speech. Approval of censorship of speech or
conduct that we find offensive or harmful seems to be an appropriate
response of a civilized society. However, a core belief of American
society and a fundamental principle of our democracy is that
“freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of . . . truth.”141 It is this
strong belief in the freedom to think and speak independent of
141. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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interference from the government that has led to the development of
First Amendment jurisprudence that has vigorously protected speech
and expressive conduct with the exception of speech or conduct that
falls within well-defined and narrowly applied categories that reside
wholly outside the protections of the First Amendment.142
One such category, “true threats,” 143 is a prospective answer to
the off-campus student speech question.144 The true threat doctrine
as established in Watts v. United States145 and reiterated in Virginia
v. Black146 sets the boundaries of a category of speech that resides
wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment. Such speech
is a manifestation of the speaker’s purpose “to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence
to a particular individual or group of individuals.”147 As opposed to a
questionable mélange of jurisprudence that allows capacious
regulation of student speech, a true threat analysis would strike the

142. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
143. See Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 621–27 (8th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (applying Watts’s true threat analysis in a case involving a school regulating student
speech); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371–73 (9th Cir. 1996) (also
applying Watts’s threat analysis in a case of a school regulating student speech). The Wisniewski
court addressed this analysis and dismissed it in the case of schools regulating student speech,
distinguishing the criminal statute in question in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705
(1969), from a school entity’s “authority to discipline a student’s expression reasonably
understood as urging violent conduct.” Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.
2007). That court found it more appropriate to evaluate such cases under Tinker, a case where
the speech did not involve any threat of violence or personal attack of any kind.
144. The ultimate solution to controlling student speech that may qualify as
cyberbullying must include a combination of legal, social, and educational reform that includes
regulation of student speech or expressive behavior only on the rare occasion that such speech
constitutes a true threat to another individual or violates already existing criminal or civil
statutes as well as 1) help for potential victims to learn how to protect themselves and get help
when needed; 2) encouragement of a culture and environment of civility and respect; 3)
programs designed to educate students about appropriate and inappropriate use of humor; and
4) creation and support for assistance and resources to students and parents regarding bullying
in general, the risks to bullies and victims, warning signs that a child is bullying or is being
bullied, networks through which to report instances of cyberbullying, and so forth. This
Comment is limited to a discussion of the First Amendment implications of regulating offcampus student speech, but realizes that this problem can and should be attacked from a
variety of fronts. In narrowing the purview of schools’ authority to regulate speech, the
Comment does not purport that other attacks on pernicious cyberbullying should be any less
vigorous.
145. 394 U.S. 705 (1968).
146. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
147. Id. at 359.
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proper balance between the interests in protecting children and
maintaining an effective educational environment, and the interest in
protecting individual free speech rights. It is consistent with already
developed First Amendment jurisprudence. Moreover, the true
threat standard is more congruent with the strong protections
initially granted to student speech in Tinker.
As the principal case on point, Tinker set a standard that was
highly protective of student speech, particularly speech that was in
danger of being regulated because of its content or viewpoint.
Courts have already granted public school entities considerably more
leeway in regulating student speech when compared with speech that
the government may generally regulate. This is because though
neither “students [n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech . . . at the schoolhouse gate,”148 neither are such
First Amendment rights “automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings”149 and such rights may be limited according
to the “special characteristics of the school environment.”150
The Tinker Court realized that the overwhelming tendency of a
government organization seeking to maintain order and an
authoritarian atmosphere would be to limit divergent views through
censorship. The Court expressly reminds school entities that
[a]ny departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble.
Any variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any
word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that
deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or
cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk,
and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this
kind of openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of
the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in
this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.151

Thus, the Tinker standard incontrovertibly required that
[i]n order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to

148. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
149. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
150. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
151. Id. at 508–09 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1949)).
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show that its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no
finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct
would “materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,” the prohibition
cannot be sustained.152

However, when students began to engage in off-campus speech
over the Internet, that speech was immediately available to a
worldwide audience, and schools were grasping for ways in which to
control it. As the Third Circuit held in Layshock, Fraser could not be
extended to regulate vulgar, lewd or offensive off-campus speech.
Fraser’s exception to Tinker is powerful when applied appropriately
to lewd or offensive speech at a school-sanctioned event where there
is a captive audience of other minor school children. In such a case,
the school may decide whether the speech is lewd, vulgar, or
offensive and may permissibly regulate such speech. But if such
speech occurs off-campus, the application of Fraser becomes
treacherously tenuous.
Likewise, the narrow exception of Hazelwood did not provide a
quick or easy remedy to prevent such inappropriate speech over the
Internet or through text messages. Hazelwood required that the
speech in question reasonably bear the imprimatur of the school and
be related to a legitimate pedagogical concern. There is little doubt
that student speech arising from a posting on a personal networking
site while at home, outside of school hours, and using the student’s
own computer or cellular device would not bear the imprimatur of
the school. And so, schools and courts looked back again to the
Tinker language.
If it were possible to commandeer the Tinker standard and show
that off-campus student speech would cause a material and
substantial disruption at the school, that might justify the regulation
of speech that occurs entirely away from campus. Some courts were
unwilling to stretch Tinker that far and continued to require a
finding that the speech was implicitly on-campus speech, or that
there was a sufficient nexus between the speech and the disturbance

152. Id. at 509 (emphasis added) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th
Cir. 1966)).
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at the school. However, the most permissive interpretations of
Tinker required only that the school demonstrate that the speech
could foreseeably cause a material and substantial disturbance; once
the school entity could show that, the location where the speech
occurred no longer had any bearing. The nature of the speech lost its
relevance as well—it may be lewd, vulgar, or other speech that could
be otherwise protected under the First Amendment, but if it was
reasonably foreseeable that it could lead to a substantial disturbance,
the school could permissibly punish the student for the speech or
conduct.
This abundant willingness to justify overbroad regulation of offcampus student speech pursuant to Tinker is inappropriate and will
lead to impermissible regulations of student speech. Think for a
moment about a fictional student, Ahmed, who is Muslim and has
moved to a school district that is overwhelmingly populated with
students from conservative Christian homes. On his Facebook
account, Ahmed begins to post and discuss his religion. There is
little understanding of Islam in this fictional school district and most
automatically associate Ahmed’s postings with terrorist acts
propagated by Islamic extremists. In such a case, there is an
absolutely foreseeable risk of a material and substantial disturbance at
the school. The disturbance would, most likely, be related to the
student’s speech. But the school should absolutely not be allowed to
punish Ahmed for such speech. Under the First Amendment, such
speech is vigorously protected.
The initial Layshock opinion was correct; neither Layshock nor
Blue Mountain should be analyzed under Tinker because the speech
occurred away from school property, without the assistance of any
school resources, and was not offered at or in conjunction with any
school-sanctioned event. In both cases the speech occurred in the
privacy of the student’s home or the home of a close family member.
Extending Tinker to apply to such speech would allow schools to
exercise in loco parentis influence well beyond appropriate limitations
and would infringe not only on the student’s free speech and privacy
rights, but on parents’ rights as well.
The Layshock court was also correct in holding that the speech
cannot be regulated under Fraser. Even though the speech may be
categorized as lewd, or vulgar, it was not offered at a schoolsanctioned event wherein a large number of minor school students
were a captive audience to the speech in question. This type of
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speech is of the variety that falls squarely under the protection of the
First Amendment. The Third Circuit should be reluctant to endorse
a standard that would open the door to “permissible” regulations of
student speech that surpass in breadth any previously permissible
regulation of speech. Even in the case of sexually explicit or obscene
speech, where the Supreme Court has demonstrated an inclination to
allow broader state regulation of an individual’s speech compared to
other types of speech, the boundary of regulation ended at the
threshold of the speaker’s home. If the Third Circuit were to
endorse Bethlehem’s ephemeral sufficient nexus standard,
Wisniewski’s ambiguous foreseeable risk standard, or the reasonable
possibility test from Blue Mountain, it would extend the
schoolmaster’s reach where Stanley v. Georgia did not dare tread—
into the privacy of individuals’ households.153
Rather, because the speech in both cases occurred off-campus
and not in conjunction with any school-sanctioned activities, the
Third Circuit should examine the intent of the students and
determine whether either scenario rose to the level of a true threat
that could be a constitutional regulation of student off-campus
speech.154 The true threat doctrine encompasses speech “where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals.”155 Though “the speaker need not actually
intend to carry out the threat,” and courts may consider the victim’s
subjective fear of violence,156 the government would bear the burden
of the proving that a true threat existed, and the expression in

153. 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (invalidating state laws that regulate private possession of
obscene materials). Granted, the speech in Stanley was an adult consuming pornography, and it
may be more accurate here to think of the publication or production of speech—for example,
pornography. Even then, the Supreme Court has only allowed regulation of speech that either
meets the narrow obscenity exception or that is demonstrated to actually harm individuals
unable to consent to such harm. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). For
example, the production of child pornography cannot be constitutionally regulated unless it is
produced with actual minors in the parts of the children. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
535 U.S. 234 (2002). In other words, one may engage in speech by producing child
pornography using actors who look young but are of age to consent or using computer
generated imagery. Id. at 256.
154. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007).
155. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
156. Id.
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question would be “taken in context” with regard to “the nature of
the statement and the reaction of the listeners.”157
In both Layshock and Blue Mountain, the students indicated, and
the school districts did not dispute, that the profiles were created as a
joke. Both students apologized to the affected administrators and
indicated that they did not intend any harm. Though their speech
was immature, vulgar, lewd, ill-advised, and perhaps plain stupid, it
can be credited to adolescents who have not yet developed a clear
understanding of what type of online speech can be appropriate
humor and what is not. In neither case, though, did the students
demonstrate sufficient intent to communicate a serious expression of
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to an individual or a
particular group of individuals. Indeed, the speech in question here
was more akin to the “political hyperbole” of Watts v. United
States158 that was “a kind of very crude offensive method of stating
a[n] . . . opposition” to a person in authority.159 If we are willing to
limit this kind of student speech, it will effectively chill speech not
only while the students are school-aged, but will likely chill antiestablishment speech even later in life. Additionally, in both Layshock
and Blue Mountain, the “victim” of the speech was an adult in a
position of considerable power and authority over the minor speaker
with the means to pursue alternative remedies for any imagined or
actual harm the speech may have caused.
The more difficult question is whether such an analysis is
sufficient for cases that involve student-on-student cyberbullying.
Indeed, the true threat standard can be used effectively not only for
student-on-teacher or student-on-administrator cyberbullying, but
also for student-on-student cyberbullying. Such speech would also
be regulated when the school can demonstrate that it rises to the
level of a true threat. The school may rely on the victim’s subjective
fear of violence, but must also consider the context in which the
expression was offered as well as the reaction of the audience to the
expression. If the school successfully carries that evidentiary burden,
then it could constitutionally regulate the speech in question.
Otherwise, the interest in protecting the speaker’s First Amendment

157. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1968).
158. Id. at 708.
159. Id.
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rights would outweigh the interest in limiting such speech. Recall
the facts of Emmett—a student created a website with fake obituaries
for his friends and a poll application by which visitors could vote on
who would die next.160 Such a site could seem terribly threatening.
However, “[t]he obituaries were written tongue-in-cheek, [and
were] inspired . . . by a creative writing class.”161 Additionally, the
student deleted the site after it was characterized as a “hit list” on
the local news. Moreover, the school did “not present[] any evidence
that any student actually felt threatened by the web site.”162
Generally, the evidence suggested that it was a joke and that no
harm was intended. Though it was likely an infantile and unwise
expression, and though it may have even resulted in some students
feeling intimidated,163 it was not likely a true threat.
In contrast, consider a hypothetical situation based loosely on
other cyberbullying cases. Suppose that a teenager, Cassie, is angry
with a classmate, Victor. Suppose Cassie creates a fake profile on a
social networking site of an imaginary girl, Fiona. As Fiona, Cassie
interacts online with Victor. She pretends to be interested in him,
becomes his confidante, his friend, and perhaps even his love
interest. Then, Cassie starts using Fiona to make threats to Victor.
She uses information she has discovered to humiliate and frighten
Victor. Imagine she posts a fake obituary of Victor in a place where
Victor will see it, and suppose she posts in Fiona’s social networking
status, “Watch out, Victor. You are next.” Imagine Victor is
frightened by the threat and suppose the school marshals ample
evidence that Cassie intended her speech to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence
towards Victor. In this case, Cassie’s intent makes a difference and
pushes her actions into the realm of a true threat which could be
permissibly regulated by a school entity.
In addition to permissible regulation of student speech by
schools pursuant to the true threat analysis, much speech that can be
categorized as cyberbullying is punishable through criminal or civil
statutes that constitutionally regulate harassment, defamation,
160.
2000).
161.
162.
163.

Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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slander, stalking, and so on. Furthermore, social and educational
programs can make effective inroads in this arena without posing a
threat to individual free speech rights. This Comment does not
suggest that we leave victims of cyberbullying with no remedy, only
that we tread carefully when extending the power of the government
to regulate speech even when, perhaps especially when, that
regulation is coming from a powerful school entity and is directed at
students directly under their authority.
V. CONCLUSION
Because the area of law is relatively new and because the U.S.
Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the issue of speech that could
be defined as cyberbullying, state and federal courts have struggled
to fit recent instances of off-campus digital or electronic speech into
the foundational framework created by Tinker, Fraser, and
Hazelwood. The regulated speech in each of those foundational cases
was speech occurring on school grounds or in connection with a
school-sanctioned class or event, or both.
Cases dealing with student-on-teacher or student-onadministrator cyberbullying, or both, have demonstrated a disturbing
disposition to extend Tinker to allow regulation of off-campus
student speech that would normally fall squarely in the realm of
protected speech pursuant to the First Amendment. This is an
inappropriate extension of power to government agents and will
result in the regulation of speech that should be protected.
Rather than cling to a tenuous line of case law that permits an
overbroad regulation of off-campus student speech, courts should
engage in a true threat analysis to determine whether the off-campus
student speech in question was offered with the intent to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to engage in an act of
violence against the threatened party. In many cases, the speakers
will lack the necessary intent because the speech was offered as illadvised humor with perhaps little understanding of the total effects
the speech would have.
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In conclusion, utilizing the true threat analysis will in no way
diminish the criminal or civil remedies available to victims of such
speech. Rather, it will provide apposite protection for the First
Amendment right of free speech that we hold central to our culture
and which is a foundational principle of our democracy.
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